In sickness and in power - a psychiatrist’s review
Wednesday, August 20th, 2008Notes:
- Anyone who reads this blog regularly may have noticed that I’ve been reading a lot of books recently; I am allergic to the summer you see and am on a quest to read every book ever written about psychiatry ever…
- If you can’t be bothered to read this long review there’s a summary paragraph at the end. (But make sure to read the quote about Nixon)
- I’ve not found any other psychiatrists’ reviews of this book. If you know of any please add a comment!
Medically trained and Foreign Secretary to the Callaghan Government, David Owen must have felt born to write this book, an exploration into the ailments of heads of governments during the past hundred years. It’s part insiders’ guide, part medical sleuthing and Owen admits to playing his own version of ‘guess-the-disease-of-the-person-opposite-on-the-bus’:
In February 1984 when attending Andropov’s funeral and after shaking hands with the new President, Konstantin Chernenko, at a reception in the Kremlin, I mentioned to a journalist that it was clear to me that Chernenko, then seventy three, had emphysema. The aside was soon flashed around the world, somewhat to my embarrassment.
‘In sickness and in power’ breaks down four ways. There are two round-up chapters detailing the problems of leaders 1901-1953 and 1953-2007 respectively, four in-depth case studies where Owen judges that leaders’ ailments may have landed them in particularly hot water, a detailed breakdown of the events surrounding the war in Iraq and finally Owen’s recommendations for the future.
The first two chapters are strongest. Did you know for instance that some American psychiatrists consider it highly likely that 26th US President Theodore Roosevelt suffered from bipolar affective disorder? Or that Ronald Regan was showing early signs of Alzhemier’s disease whilst still President? In the 1901-1953 chapter we learn of France’s clearly mentally deteriorating President Paul Deschanel:
Soon after his election … rumours of extravagant behaviour started circulating. He surprised crowds, for instance, by enthusiastically kissing the mouth of a First World War Soldier who had a severely mutilated face. Then, on 23 May, Deschanel disappeared from his presidential train while travelling from Paris during the night. He had either fallen from an open window … He ended up in this night clothes and with blood on his face in a gatekeeper’s house at a railway crossing. His assertions that he was the President of the Republic and had fallen off the train were met with hilarious incredulity until a doctor, who was called in, recognised him.
Around the same time 28th US President Woodrow Wilson had a stroke leading him to develop a paralysis of the left side of his body and a neglect syndrome. Rather than standing down, the obvious thing to do for a man who was subsequently unable to hold a cabinet meeting for seven months, Wilson’s personal physician informed his colleagues that he was simply suffering ‘nervous breakdown, indigestion and a depleted nervous system’. Owen speculates as to the consequences of this action; thinking that, had Wilson resigned, his healthier Vice-President may have been able to persuade Congress to ratify the treaty establishing the League of Nations and that this in turn might have helped prevent the Second World War.
The Nixon in Owen’s book appears dangerously unhinged; here’s Owen quoting journalist James Reston:
Between 9.22pm on 8 May and 4.22am on 9 May 1970, Nixon made 51 telephone calls to members of his Cabinet, his staff, magazine editors, Foreign Service Officers, newspaper reporters, repeating calls to one or the other, talking about his family, his grandparents, the civil war – sort of a sleepless, compulsive nightmare of a talk – after which, to the consternation of the Secret Service, he got into his car at dawn and drove to the Lincoln Memorial to argue with the startled young people who had come to Washington to demonstrate against the invasion of Cambodia.
The case histories are of Anthony Eden’s illness during the Suez Crisis, US President John F Kennedy’s Addison’s disease, leukaemia affecting the Shah of Iran and President Mitterrand’s prostate cancer. In all four cases the voters were unaware of the state of their leader’s health.
For Eden a botched cholecystectomy lead to severe pain and he was hospitalized with a high fever at the height of the Suez crisis. JFK was taking cortisol replacement for adrenal insufficiency, strong analgesia for chronic back pain and had a rather shady doctor who provided him with amphetamine on demand. Owen makes a direct connection between JFK’s shambolic medical treatment and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and contrasts this to his much more measured performance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when his care was much improved.
The Shah of Iran was diagnosed with leukaemia in 1974, but this was only known to a very small number of people for the next five years. Bringing in a personal dimension, Owen states that as British Foreign secretary from 1977-79 he would have encouraged the Shah to stand down had he known of his condition. He links the Shah’s inability to handle events to the Islamic Revolution, and thereon a potentially avoidable government that has contributed to the continuing instability of the Middle East.
Mitterrand gained the French Presidency on the understanding that there would be full transparency regarding this health. Of course ‘transparency’ as others might know it and ‘transparency’ to a man who had a secret second family who followed him around in a second plane on state visits, proved to be two different things. ‘The Sphinx’ managed to get his personal physician to sign a clean bill of health, presented to the French people, for many years before coming clean.
Part three is called ‘The intoxication of power’ and there’s a chapter on Iraq, which is a distillation of Owen’s other book The Hubris Syndrome. Here Owen painstakingly charts the discussions and resolutions of major players in the run up to the conflict. This was rather dull, full of the minutiae of the interactions of diplomats and politicians. In this chapter as well as throughout the book, Owen is not content merely to document events and maladies but instead proposes his own syndrome – ‘Hubris Syndrome’. A half way house between a medical condition and a rhetorical device, from the man who almost called the SDP ‘New Labour’. Hubris syndrome is all about people in positions of great power getting too big for their boots. In the introduction Owen gives us a list of symptoms which characterise this. Here are the first four:
A narcissistic propensity to see the world primarily as an arena in which they can exercise power and seek glory rather than as a place with problems that need approaching in a pragmatic and non-self-referential manner
A predisposition to take actions which seem likely to cast them in a good light – i.e. in order to change their image
A disproportionate concern with image and presentation
A messianic manner of talking about what they are doing and a tendency to exaltation.
There was something about Hubris Syndrome, which every time it was mentioned almost compelled me to throw ‘In sickness and in power’ out of the window, or at least turn to the person next to me in the bus for solace. I don’t doubt that powerful politicians may act in particular ways. I, for instance, might start to think I was superhuman if, like Tony Blair, I didn’t have to wait at a traffic light for ten years. I do not think that his counts as a disease, as to make a convincing case any proposed illness should have (at least a stab at) an aetiology, an incidence, and a population distribution to name but three. Owen makes almost no attempt to frame hubris syndrome in this way and, irritatingly, always refers to it as if it were something that had an existence outside the confines of his book.
The book finishes on some sensible and interesting points on how illness in heads of government can be protected against by the use of independent medical assessments and, in the case of hubris syndrome, strengthening democratic checks and balances.
So, if you’ve read the first two paragraphs and are now skipping to the end: This book has some fascinating chapters about illnesses suffered by heads of state and the effects their maladies had on themselves and on their governments. Towards the conclusion it loses its way and has a very boring chapter on Iraq. Throughout Owen compares his protagonists for signs of a set of behaviours he calls ‘Hubris Syndrome’. I am not convinced that he makes a strong case for this being a disease.
Margaret Cook review A Doctor in the House in The Guardian 5 April 2008
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